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1. INTRODUCTION
The wireless network and Internet are two elementary 
systems of our current generation. Especially in recent years, 
there has been a tremendous growth in development of mobile 
networks and laptops connected to the Internet and the World 
Wide Web1 which is based on mobile internet protocol (IP) 
based technology. The mobile IP2 is a standard communication 
protocol that is designed to support seamless data transmission 
for mobile device users to move from their home networks to 
foreign networks. 
In a mobile IP environment, a mobile node (MN) is initially 
attached with its home agent (HA) and the home address 
is assigned for MN by HA in the home network. While the 
MN moving from home to a visiting network, it is associated 
with a care-of address (COA). MN registers the COA at it’s 
HA with a registration procedure for informing their current 
location to HA as it is required for further communication. 
When a correspondent node delivers a data packet to MN, 
then HA will redirect the data packet destined to MN’s foreign 
agent (FA) at the visiting network. As a form of the packet 
exchanges between wired and wireless networks with mobility 
agents, the registration of IP mobility implies higher security 
risks than the static operations in the fixed networks. Due to the 
significant increase in vulnerabilities for wireless network, the 
registration procedure must be protected against any type of 
security threats. The overall mobile IP environment with MN’s 
attachment is shown in Fig. 1.
 A large number of studies have been investigated in3 to 
describe the registration signaling messages with the protocol 
description for improvement on security and/or efficiency. Since 
an efficacious registration process is of the same significance 
as the secure registration and there is a direct proportionality 
between the security and the efficiency, the registration 
protocol should be addressed with the improvisation on both of 
them. Hence, our work focuses on a specific registration of IP 
mobility using an identity based authenticated (IDA) scheme, 
which leads to a balanced effort to make secure and efficacious 
registration with minimal registration delay.
2. RELATED WORKS
The base registration protocol4,5 uses the secret keys 
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Figure 1. IP Mobility environment – MN’s attachment with 
foreign network
Home network MN’s attachment with 
visited network
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and distributes them with manual key delivery to each of the 
MNs for the authentications of its registration packets among 
the mobility agents and MN. It uses either a timestamp or a 
nonce version. The registration time is the lowest among other 
protocols, but this approach is not scalable. To acquire enhanced 
scalability and improvement in authentication, the certificate-
based public key infrastructure (CA-PKI) is employed in the 
registration protocols6-8 for the authentications among MN, FA, 
and HA. CA-PKI uses public key based certificates [PKC] and 
digital signatures. Due to MN’s limited computing power and 
low bandwidth, it is not possible for MN to do complex public-
key based and certificate retrieval operations.
To overcome the deficiency in CA-PKI based registration 
methods, a registration scheme is introduced by Lam9, et al., 
with minimal use of the certificate-based public keys. However, 
it suffers with the absence of integrity between MN-FA and 
FA-HA during the transmission of the packets and also the 
registration delay is still fairly long due to the certificate-based 
operations. The Yang’s protocol10 is proposed the registration 
scheme which combines both secure key and minimal public 
key in addition to produce the communication session key 
for providing integrity between all correspondent pairs of the 
registration protocol. But it increases the registration delay 
up to 36.66 milliseconds (ms) approximately, compared to 
other protocols. An identity based secure session key (ID 
based SSK) is proposed11 to attain a better performance and 
to exclude the time consuming certificate based operations. In 
this approach, Authentication, Authorization and Accounting 
(AAA) protocol12 is combined with the ID based scheme 
for reduction in registration latency up to about 63 per cent 
compared to the existing ID based protocols13-15. The two 
protocols time invariant and time variant16 are proposed to the 
improvement of the IP mobility registration that uses a self 
certified key exchange to generate the secret key. However, 
these protocols are addressed the security and efficiency in 
terms of two different variants rather than providing a balanced 
effort on registration procedure. 
To address the balancing of both security and the 
efficiency, a registration using certificateless PKI17 is proposed 
to lessen the registration delay with the considerable amount of 
security. Nevertheless, the certificateless PKI was established 
with higher registration delay about 30.48 ms. The protocol18 
with user anonymity is proposed for IP based mobile networks. 
It reduces the registration delay through a minimal usage of 
the identity based signature scheme. On the other hand, the 
signature scheme introduces the extra complexity on signing 
and verifying the messages. An ID-based authentication 
protocol with hierarchical support19 was proposed for the 
registration with the multihops between MN and HA. This 
approach provides an access authentication with ID-based 
signature operations. The proposal lessens the total latency 
about 50 per cent and 83 per cent, respectively, compared 
with the existing ID-based signature and RSA-based signature 
schemes. However, these signature schemes incur an additional 
cost for signing and verifying the messages.
To preserve the privacy of MN, the proposal20 investigates 
the dynamic revocation of the MN with group signature. 
Here, the mobility agents and the MN attach the signature 
for authentication. The home registration of the protocol is 
designed to reduce the handover latency while providing the 
authentication between MN and HA. The research work21 has 
been investigated with the balanced effort on security and 
efficiency. The protocol reduces the registration time up to 
~ 41 per cent compared with Yang’s protocol. Owing to the 
increase of deceitful activities in the mobile IP based network, 
the necessity of the improvement on security is also increased. 
Nevertheless, the usage of the security must be afforded to the 
registration protocol without compromising the efficiency. 
Therefore, the registration protocol must be improved 
to overcome the trade-off between security and efficiency. 
Building and expanding the registration protocols of the 
above discussed related works, the current paper suggests the 
proposal using IDA scheme to enhance the security with the 
same significance of efficiency. In this paper, authors presented 
a registration protocol using IDA scheme22-23. There are four 
major contributions of this paper as follows: 
(i) the proposed work introduces IDA scheme for reducing 
computational cost as compared to the previously 
proposed registration protocols; 
(ii) the proposed protocol uses the nonces from MN, HA, and 
FA to prevent all possible replay attacks; 
(iii) to optimize the proposed protocol, the private keys are 
generated by MN rather than distributed to MN over open 
links and thus eliminates the communication steps;
(iv) the proposed protocol is verified using widely accepted 
AVISPA tool.
3. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose a new IP mobility registration 
protocol using IDA key exchange scheme without signature 
operations. The IDA scheme is introduced between the mobile 
agents and MN. It reduces the computational overload without 
extra message exchange time and can be applied to low-power 
devices such as mobile devices.
3.1 Notations
The notations used in the proposed protocol are shown in 
Table 1.
Table 1. Notations used in the proposed protocol
Symbol Description
H Hash function
|| Concatenation
< > Message Authentication Code (MAC)
{} Encryption
AuthN Authentication of a node
NMN, NHA, NFA
Nonces produced by MN, HA and FA 
respectively
IDMN, IDHA, IDFA Identity of MN, HA and FA respectively
KMN-HA Shared secret key between MN and HA
3.2 Protocol Portrayal
The proposed protocol is consisting of the following 
steps.
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Step 1: Agent Advertisement
FA  MN: AA where AA = Advertisement, IDFA, MNCOA, 
NFA.
The agent advertises their presence by AA message where 
AA = Advertisement, IDFA, MNCOA, NFA to all MNs nearby 
through broadcasting.
Step 2: Sending registration request from MN to FA
MN   FA: RReq_1, <RReq_1> KMN-HA, TMN and AuthMN 
where RReq_1 = IDHA, IDMN, MNCOA, NHA, and NMN.
In the setup of IDA scheme, a key generation center (KGC) 
chooses a master secret key s and computes PMN = H (IDMN).
Then it generates a private key of MN, SMN = sPMN. Note that s 
is maintained as master secret value to everyone except KGC. 
In addition to above setup, KGC performs the private key 
issuing process to MN via a secure channel. The MN chooses 
an ephemeral private key a and computes the following,
TMN = a SMN
TMN
* = a P (a point on elliptic curve)
AuthMN = H (IDMN || IDFA || TMN || TMN
*)
MN also computes MAC of RReq_1 message with KMN-
HA where RReq_1 = IDHA, IDMN, MNCOA, NHA, and NMN. After 
computing, MN sends RReq_1 message, MAC of RReq_1, 
TMN and AuthMN to FA.
Step 3: Forwarding registration request from FA to HA
FA   HA: RReq_1, <RReq_1> KMN-HA, TFA and AuthFA
Upon receiving step 2 message, FA computes TMN
*’ = 
s-1TMN and check if H (IDMN || IDFA || TMN || TMN
*’) equals AuthMN. 
If they are not equal, FA terminates the protocol. Otherwise FA 
authenticates MN. The KGC computes PFA = H (IDFA). Then it 
generates a private key of FA, SFA = sPFA. After the setup with 
initial computation, KGC issues the private key to FA via a 
secure channel. The FA chooses an ephemeral private key b 
and computes the following,
TFA  = b SFA
TFA
* = b P (a point on elliptic curve)
AuthFA   = H (IDHA || IDFA || TFA || TFA
*)
After computing, FA forwards the registration request 
message, MAC of RReq_1 with TFA and AuthFA to HA.
Step 4: Sending registration reply from HA to FA 
HA  FA: RRep_1, <RRep_1> KMN-HA, {N
’
HA}KMN-HA, 
THA and AuthHA where RRep_1 = IDHA, NHA, and NMN.
Upon receiving the message from FA, HA verifies the 
authentication of MN through MAC value by the shared key 
KMN-HA. HA computes TFA
*’ = s-1 TFA and check if H (IDHA || IDFA 
|| TFA || TFA
*’) equals AuthFA. If they are not the same, HA rejects 
the registration request. Otherwise HA authenticates FA. The 
KGC computes PHA = H (IDHA). Then it generates a private key 
of HA, SHA = s PHA. After the computation, KGC issues the 
private key to HA through a secure channel. The HA chooses 
an ephemeral private key c and computes the following,
THA = c SHA
THA
* = c P (a point on elliptic curve)
AuthHA   = H (IDHA || IDFA || THA || TFA
*’)
HA also computes new nonce N’HA and enciphers it 
with the shared key KMN-HA. After computing, HA then sends 
RRep_1 message where RRep_1 = IDHA, NHA, and NMN, MAC 
of RRep_1, enciphered text of new nonce, THA and AuthHA to 
FA.
Step 5: Forwarding registration reply from FA to MN
FA  MN: RRep_1, <RRep_1> KMN-HA, {N
’
HA}KMN-HA, 
TFA and AuthFA
Before forwarding registration reply to MN from HA, FA 
checks if H (IDHA || IDFA || THA || TFA
*) equals AuthHA. If they 
are not equivalent, then FA terminates the registration reply 
message. Otherwise FA authenticates HA. Then FA forwards 
RRep_1, <RRep_1> KMN-HA, and {N
’
HA}KMN-HA, with TFA and 
AuthFA (as computed in step 3) messages to MN.
Step: 6: Receiving registration reply from FA to MN
Upon receipt of step 5 message from FA, MN verifies the 
authentication of HA through MAC value. Then, MN computes 
TFA
*’ = s-1 TFA and checks if H (IDHA || IDFA || TFA || TFA
*’) equals 
AuthFA. If they are not the same, MN rejects the registration 
reply. Otherwise MN authenticates FA. MN also verifies 
the nonces and then updates its necessary fields in dynamic 
parameter database for the next registration.
4. SECURITY VERIFICATION AND ANALYSIS 
4.1 Security Verification using AVISPA 
The proposed protocol is simulated and verified using 
automated validation of internet security protocol and 
applications (AVISPA) tool24-26. The AVISPA tool has been used 
to analyze and verify the security properties of the protocols. 
AVISPA offers the following:
• A protocol designer can interact with the AVISPA tool by 
specifying a security scenario with high-level protocol 
specification language (HLPSL) which is an expressive 
and role based language.
• HLPSL specifications are translated into equivalent 
Intermediate Format (IF). 
• IF specifications are put in to the back-ends of the AVISPA 
tool, which employ four analysis methods: 
(1) On-the-fly model-checker (OFMC) is used for performing 
protocol falsification and bounded confirmation by the 
state transition model. 
(2) Constraint-logic-based attack searcher (CL-AtSe) 
back-end is exploited for simplification heuristics and 
redundancy elimination techniques. 
(3) SAT-based model-checker (SATMC) creates a 
propositional formula encoding with the transition relation 
for describing a violation of the security properties. 
(4) Tree automata based on automatic approximations for 
the analysis of security protocols (TA4SP) is used to 
approximate the interloper information by means of 
regular tree languages and rewriting.
The scenario of a protocol simulation in AVISPA consists 
of three entities and five message exchanges, wherein MN, 
FA and HA are based on the IDA scheme. The simulation 
starts with the step 1 message, and follows with the messages 
step 2 to 5 for successful running of the entire protocol. The 
simulation of the protocol engrosses the following steps:
1. First, three entities, such as the MN, HA, and FA are 
defined in HLPSL specifications.
SENTHIL KUMAR & VALARMATHI : AN EFFICACIOUS AND SECURE REGISTRATION FOR IP MOBILITY
505
2. The FA sends an advertisement message AA to MN.
3. Then, the MN generates the authentication AuthMN and 
registration request message. It sends them to FA.
4. The FA creates AuthFA and forwards the message to HA.
5. The HA verifies AuthFA and generates the reply message 
and AuthHA. Subsequently, it sends registration reply to 
FA.
6. Next, FA checks AuthHA and forwards the reply message 
to MN.
7. Finally, the MN verifies the claim made by FA with 
AuthFA.
4.2 Authentication
The authentication of a communication entity plays an 
important role to endorse one another’s individuality while 
sending the message between IP mobility based networks. 
Our proposed scheme provides better authentication among 
MN, HA and FA through AuthMN, AuthHA, and AuthFA with 
IDA scheme and MAC. From Table 2, it is analyzed that 
the proposed method gives the authentication between all 
correspondent entities of the IP mobility registration through 
light loaded security functions rather bilinear pairings and 
signature operations when compared to other methods.
4.4 Rerun Attack Prevention and Location Privacy
The rerun attack prevention ensures that no message 
is processed more than once. In the proposed scheme, it is 
provided through the nonces between MN and the mobility 
agents.  When an impostor reruns step 2 messages that is 
previously received by HA, HA will verify the NHA from the 
received message. Because HA’s superseded nonce in the 
request does not equal HA’s new nonce stored on HA, HA 
will discard the request. Therefore, the replay attack fails. And 
also the paper deals with user anonymity by an attribute called 
location privacy through temporary identity IDMN of the MN. 
Table 3 shows replay attack prevention and location privacy 
analysis of the existing IP Mobility registration protocols with 
the proposed protocol. 
Table 2.  Authentication analysis
Protocol MN-FA FA-HA MN-HA
Base4,5 None None MAC
Protocols in6,7 Digital signature
Digital 
signature
Digital 
signature
Protocol in8 None PKC PKI
Protocol in9 PKI Digital 
signature
Symmetric 
encryption
Protocol in10 None Digital 
signature
Symmetric 
encryption
ID based SSK11 None AAA AAA
Protocol in16 None MAC MAC
Certificateless PKI17 None Digital 
signature
MAC
Protocol in18 None ID based 
signature
MAC
Proposed IDA IDA MAC
Table 3. Replay attack prevention and location privacy 
analysis
Protocol Rerun attack Location privacy
Base4,5 None None
Protocol in7 None None
Protocol in 9 None None
Protocol in10 Yes None
ID based SSK11 Yes None
Protocol in16 Yes Yes
Certificateless PKI17 Yes Yes
Protocol in18 Yes Yes
Proposed Yes Yes
4.3 Certificateless PKI Communication
The proposed protocol with IDA scheme uses a 
certificateless PKI communication. The motivation for using 
IDA scheme instead of PKI is that the PKI uses the certificate 
which requires the cost effective process for certificate 
distribution and revocation that the IDA scheme does not require. 
Also, the PKI needs to verify each and every communication 
with the certificates. In the setup of the proposed protocol 
using IDA; the communication between sender and receiver 
needs to recognize the individuality of the receiver. It uses the 
KGC instead of the PKI that generates a partial private key SMN 
using the master secret key that is known only by KGC and it 
is distributed to the MN via a secure channel.
5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
For the performance evaluation, we used the following 
requirements on hardware platform for FA, HA and MN to set-
up a model for Mobile IP registration environment. Basically, 
MN is a low power device than mobility agents. Thus, the 
hardware platform on FA and HA is a Core 2 Duo with 2.33 
GHz processor under Windows XP SP 3; the one on MN is 
the HP (Compaq) iPAQ H3670 with a 206 MHz Strong ARM 
processor and 64 MB RAM, running the windows CE 2.11 
pocket PC operating system.
5.1 Message Size 
In the proposed method, the computed message size 
of the registration request and reply between MN and FA is 
75 bytes; FA and HA is 155 bytes; HA and FA is 130 bytes; 
FA and MN is 43 bytes. Table 4 lists the message size of the 
various registration protocols in bytes among MN, FA and HA 
and they are compared with proposed method. The proposed 
protocol lessens the message size between MN and mobility 
agents when compared with Yang’s protocol, time variant and 
time invariant. Certainly, the smallest amount of messages is 
exchanged in the base protocol while its security is the feeblest. 
Thus, it is examined that the proposed protocol offers less 
registration signaling traffic while providing better security.
5.2 Registration Delay Comparisons
The registration of  IP  mobility is depending on the 
signaling traffic in  terms of  message  size among the 
participating entities of mobile IP environment. Here, the 
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operation time for secure hash algorithm (SHA) to create 
hash value, and advanced encryption standard (AES) with 
encryption and decryption on FA and HA are obtained from27-
30. The registration delay of the proposed scheme is estimated 
from the message size among MN, HA and FA and the system 
parameters31. The message transmission time is calculated by 
dividing the message size by the bit rate in wired or wireless 
links. For instance, the registration time for step 2 is computed 
based on the following estimation: 0.5 ms (MN processing time) 
+ 2 ms (propagation time in wireless links) + 0.3 ms (message 
transmission time in wireless links = 75 bytes / 2 Mbps) + 
0.019111 ms (SHA operation) = 2.8191ms. Accordingly, the 
registration time is estimated with each of the steps of our 
proposed protocol as follows: step 2 + step 3 + step 4 + step 5 
= 2.819111 + 1.124 + 1.012196 + 7.461111 = 12.31 ms.
Figure 2 illustrates the comparison result of registration 
protocols in terms of the registration delay in milliseconds. The 
registration time of base protocol is very low but maintains the 
lowest level of security. It is clear that the efficiency of CA-
PKI and Lam proposal is limited by heavy certificate-based 
operations on MN. Yang’s protocol requires highest registration 
time comparatively with other registration protocols. The time 
variant and invariant based protocols have more traffic with 
longer registration delay than the proposed protocol because 
of the witness operations. Certainly, the most messages are 
exchanged in ID based protocol for performing signature based 
operations with its higher registration time. Thus, the proposed 
protocol has less registration time and signaling traffic while 
providing better security.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The paper proposes the registration of IP mobility using 
IDA scheme to provide better security and to minimize the 
registration delay. The IDA key exchange protocol is used to 
provide authentication. The nonces from MN, HA, and FA 
prevents the possible replay attacks. The security attributes of 
the registration protocol are provided with authentication, rerun 
attack prevention and location privacy. The proposed work 
is verified for security using AVISPA tool. The performance 
evaluation demonstrates that the proposed protocol outperforms 
the existing protocols. For future work, it can be extended to 
Mobile IPv6 based networks and can be applied to variety of 
wireless networks, such as WLAN, Bluetooth, and beyond 3G 
mobile networks.
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